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This article investigates the determinants of entry and exit in the Austrian manufacturing sector based on 1981 
to 1994 data. We study the response of entry, exit and other indicators of firm dynamics to changes in average 
plant size, size heterogeneity, concentration, incentives and vertical integration. By applying Bayesian 
simulation methods we estimate random coefficient models and study the  symmetry of the determinants of entry 
and exit. Our empirical analysis shows that entry and exit rates are driven by the same determinants. The 
impacts of these determinants are nearly homogeneous for both, entry rates and exits rates, respectively. 
Moreover, we find (i) that changes in average plant size, size heterogeneity and concentration are not symmetric 
with respect to entry and exit, (ii) that changes in the growth of sales is weakly symmetric and (iii) that the 
growth rate of employment is strongly asymmetric across industries in Austrian manufacturing. Furthermore, 
we infer from the data that the turnover of firms influences the changes in the number of competitors. Low entry 
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Abstract
This article investigates the determinants of entry and exit in the Austrian manufacturing sec-
tor based on 1981 to 1994 data. We study the response of entry, exit and other indicators
of ﬁrm dynamics to changes in average plant size, size heterogeneity, concentration, incentives
and vertical integration. By applying Bayesian simulation methods we estimate random coef-
ﬁcient models and study the symmetry of the determinants of entry and exit. Our empirical
analysis shows that entry and exit rates are driven by the same determinants. The impacts of
these determinates are nearly homogeneous for both, entry rates and exits rates, respectively.
Moreover, we ﬁnd (i) that changes in average plant size, size heterogeneity and concentration
are not symmetric with respect to entry and exit, (ii) that changes in the growth of sales is
weakly symmetric and (iii) that the growth rate of employment is strongly asymmetric across
industries in Austrian manufacturing. Furthermore, we infer from the data that the turnover
of ﬁrms inﬂuences the changes in the number of competitors. Low entry rates go hand in hand
with low net entry rates and a low turnover.
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11 Introduction
Critical issues in Industrial Organization, such as competition, eﬃciency are studied by looking at
the determinants of the inﬂow and the outﬂow of ﬁrms. The entry and exit of ﬁrms is an outcome
of the markets’ selection process. Entry and exit play a central role in industrial organization.
Theories of limit pricing and the theory of contestable markets rely on the availability of a number
of potential entrants to discipline incumbents. Models of Schumpeterian competition emphasize the
role of new entrants as carriers of new ideas. The question what fosters and what hinders the entry
of new ﬁrms into speciﬁc industries and the relationship between entry and exit is an important
research question for industrial dynamics but ﬁgures also prominently in policy discussions in most
industrial countries. Public programs to promote new entry are common practice in most countries
of the European Union.
There are many papers which investigate the reasons behind entry and exit. This largely empirical
literature has contributed to a better understanding of the determinants of the inﬂows and outﬂows
of ﬁrms by establishing a number of stylized facts about entry and exit (see e.g. Geroski (1995),
Caves (1998)). Entry and exit are quite volatile over time and highly correlated (see Cable and
Schwalbach (1991), Geroski (1995)). It is sometimes argued that industries are more consistently
characterized by turnover rates than by net entry rates (see Dunne et al. (1988)). We want to
test this conjecture for Austrian manufacturing. This paper focuses on the short and medium run
dynamics of entry and exit. The competing metaphors of the relationship between entry and exit are
the metaphor of displacement, where new ﬁrms displace ineﬃcient incumbents, replacement, where
exit opens the room for new ﬁrms, and the revolving door metaphor, where there is considerable
entry and exit but very little permanent penetration (see Audretsch (1995)). The third metaphor is
also related to the hypothesis of symmetry, which states that the close relationship between entry
and exit is due to fact that their determinants are actually the same. Which of the metaphors
describes the relationship between entry and exit best is still an open question (see Shapiro and
Khemani (1987), Fotopoulos and Spence (1998)). The need to understand the short-term dynamics
of entry and exit and exit is motivated by important economic policy concerns about entry and
exit.
In this article the data comprise industry based time series form 1981 to 1994, 17 manufacturing
industries are within the data set. We apply Bayesian simulation methods in order to estimate ran-
dom coeﬃcient models. This methodology is that it provides an elegant method of model selection
and allows thereby to obtain a parsimonious model which is capable to reﬂect the heterogeneity
in the data in an appropriate way. To our knowledge our application is the ﬁrst application of
this methodology to study entry and exit dynamics. This methodology allows us to cluster indus-
tries (Bayesian clustering). I.e. we estimate groups of industries where similar behavior can be
observed simultaneously with the model parameters. This analysis will show that the clustering
is principally driven by the diﬀerent growth rates of the diﬀerent entry and exit time series. Our
results suggest that at the industry level entry and exit are related in a dynamic way, at bottom of
which demand and the nature industrial competition are responsible for the degree of turbulence
2observed. This paper shows that there is a close relationship between entry and exit rates across
industries. Moreover, the turnover of ﬁrms inﬂuences the changes in the number of competitors,
while low entry rates go hand in hand with low net entry rates and a low turnover. Furthermore, we
test the symmetry hypothesis. For our data set we ﬁnd out that the growth rates of the minimum
eﬃcient scale, of heterogeneity within industries and of industry concentration are not symmetric.
The growth rate of sales is weakly symmetric while the growth rate of employment is asymmetric.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses current literature on entry and exit dynamics
and presents the data. Section 3 illustrates the statistical framework used in this paper. A brief
analysis on MCMC estimation of the latent class model is skipped to Appendix A. Section 4
presents and discusses the estimation results; section 5 concludes.
2 Market Entry and Market Exit
Entry is a response to perceived opportunities by new entrepreneurs, exit is induced by expected
losses and provides a release of productive resources to alternative uses. Two sets of variables are
central with respect to barriers and incentives when considering entry and exit (see Siegfried and
Evans (1994), Geroski (1995), Caves (1998)). The literature on entry barriers emphasizes that
there are market conditions that allow incumbents to raise prices above costs without attracting
entry. Barriers to entry and barriers create an asymmetry between incumbents and potential new
entrants. These barriers are often related to sunk costs. Incentives on the other hand refer to
the expansion of the market and higher proﬁtability which signal a potential disequilibrium. In
this paper we focus on the relationship between entry and exit and changes in variables related to
technology, market power, opportunity and incentives.
A second question we study is the relationship between entry and exit. It is a stylized fact that
entry and exit are highly and positively correlated (see e.g. Cable and Schwalbach (1991), Geroski
(1995)). This implies that entry and exit processes are dominated by within-industry replacement,
while the transfer of ﬁrms from declining to expanding industries (between-industry replacement)
is less important. The unconditional correlation between entry and exit is 0.512 and signiﬁcant at
the one percent level for Austrian Manufacturing. The high correlation can be due to the symmetry
of entry and exit barriers or due replacement and displacement eﬀects. We will study whether the
variables we use are symmetric. Moreover, we will investigate conditional probabilities in order to
answer the question whether a high entry rate implies a high exit rate (low net entry rate) and
whether a high volatility of entry and exit implies high net entry rates.
In this paper we use data to from the membership statistics of the Austrian Chambers of Commerce
(WK¨ O) for the years 1980-1994. The data pertain to the two-digit level of industrial classiﬁcation
and are coded according to the code system by institutional aspects of the Austrian Chamber
of Commerce.1 To construct the independent variables we use the number of entries in year t,
ENt, the number of exits in year t, EXt and the number of ﬁrms in year t, Nt. From these time
series we construct the independent variables gross entry rate (Entry), gross exit rate (Exit), net
1The industries will be presented in Table 10.
3Table 1: Dependent Variables
Variable Name Deﬁnition Source
Gross Entry Rate Entry ENt
Nt−1 ∗ 100 WK¨ O
Gross Exit Rate Exit EXt
Nt−1 ∗ 100 WK¨ O
Net Entry Rate Net
Nt−Nt−1
Nt−1 ∗ 100 WK¨ O
Turnover Rate Turn Entry + Exit WK¨ O
Volatility Rate V ol Turn − |Entry − Exit| WK¨ O
Notes: ENt is the number of entrants in year t, EXt is the number of exits in year t, Nt is the number of ﬁrms in year t and WK¨ O denotes the
membership statistics of the Austrian Chambers of Commerce.
entry rate (Net), turnover rate (Turn) and the volatility rate (V ol). These series are stationary;
cointegration relationships cannot be detected. Table 1 gives an overview over the variables. For
more details on the construction and interpretation of the data the interested reader is referred to
H¨ olzl (2003). Table 2 provides the summary statistics. Let yi,t, i = 1,...,I t = 1,...,T, represent
the corresponding random variable: the column mean presents the sample average, the column
StdDev shows the standard deviation, the columns Min and Max ﬁgure min(yi,t) and max(yi,t)
respectively.
Beside the entry and exit rates we use net entry rates, turnover rates and also volatility rates as
indicators of industrial dynamics. These variables are transformations of the variables Entry and
Exit. The net entry rate, Net, measures the change in number of ﬁrms; since Nt = Nt−1 +ENt −
EXt, the net entry rate is the diﬀerence between the entry and the exit rate, i.e. Net = Enty−Exit.
It is primarily an indicator of the growth or decline of the number of active ﬁrms. However, net
entry does not account for the turnover of the identities of ﬁrms. Therefore we use also the turnover
and the volatility of ﬁrms. The turnover reﬂects entry and exit dynamics in terms of changes in
the identities of ﬁrms in the industry. The turnover accounts for both changes in market size
and replacement eﬀects. Thereby it allows to investigate the symmetry hypothesis whether entry
barriers are also exit barriers. The same holds for incentives. The volatility rate is a measure of the
excess turnover, that is the turnover in identities which does not lead to changes in the stock of ﬁrms.
Volatility is deﬁned as the turnover minus the absolute value of the diﬀerence between entry and
exit. Little algebra shows that V ol = 2(1(Net>0)Exit + 1(Net≤0)Entry)=2(1(Entry−Exit>0)Exit +
1(Entry−Exit≤0)Entry); 1(.) is an indicator function. Volatility is a measure of the turbulence within
an industry. Industries with high volatility are those industries where large numbers of new ﬁrms
displace a large number of incumbents, without aﬀecting the total number of ﬁrms. By construction,
volatility measures what triggers the replacement of incumbents by new ﬁrms.
In order to study the symmetry hypothesis we distinguish between weak and strong symmetry and
weak and strong asymmetry. Symmetry is deﬁned as independent variables having the same inﬂu-
ence on entry and exit. We deﬁne weak symmetry as symmetry of the sign: sign(parameter)|Entry =
sign(parameter)|Exit. Strong symmetry is related to the value of the parameters ± the estimated
4Table 2: Summary statistics of dependent variables, values are expressed in percent.
Variable Mean StdDev Min Max
Entry rate 6.376 2.858 0.000 27.273
Exit rate 7.647 3.806 0.000 36.364
Net entry rate -1.154 3.359 -15.789 8.475
Turnover rate 14.007 5.793 0.000 63.636
Volatility rate 15.160 7.431 -0.263 71.970
standard deviations. Strong symmetry can be observed by a parameter equal to zero in the net
entry regression. Weak asymmetry is deﬁned by sign(parameter)|Entry = −sign(parameter)|Exit.
Strong asymmetry is related to the value of the parameters and can be observed by a parameter ±
the estimated standard deviations equal to zero in the turnover regression.
Let us now turn to the independent variables. We aim at establishing whether there is a relationship
between entry and exit dynamics and changes in average plant size, changes in concentration, and
changes in the size heterogeneity within industries, as well as to changes in incentives and vertical
integration. Table 3 provides an overview of the variables and their expected signs and Table 4
presents the descriptive statistics.
As measures of incentives we use the growth rates of deﬂated industry sales (GS) and the growth
rate of employment (GE). Higher market growth should indicate opportunities for new entrants
and reduce the selection pressure for incumbents. As the incentives are expected to be asymmetric
for entry and exit, that is, positive for entry and negative for exit, we expect a strong positive
association with net entry. When the eﬀects have approximately the same size with regard to entry
and exit (strong asymmetry) then the association with turnover should not be diﬀerent from zero
(see Table 3).
As measure of complexity of operations we use the measure of vertical integration proposed by
Adelman (1955), value added over gross production values, which can be used as proxy for the
complexity of operations (e.g. Pennings and Sleuwagen (2000)). Transaction cost theory predicts
that the complexity of production is related to the complexity of contracts, therefore a higher
complexity of production processes should be associated with a higher degree of vertical integration
(see e.g. Williamson (1975), Masten (1984)). The degree of vertical integration within an industry
changes when value added and gross production change. This measure is not only related to
changes in vertical integration per se but also to changes in input prices and quality upgrading
innovations, which increases the value added with respect to gross production. A high degree of
vertical integration is expected to be both a barrier to entry and a barrier to exit due to the sunk
cost eﬀect. Higher vertical integration and quality improving innovations are likely to deter entry,
as the set up costs rise in both cases. However, the eﬀect on exit may be indeterminate as with
this process weak incumbents may decide to abandon the industry, thereby increasing exit. On the
5other hand incumbents may be tempted to remain longer in the market due to the sunk cost eﬀect.
A-priori it is diﬃcult to predict which of these eﬀects dominates. We expect that a conservation
eﬀect prevails. Changes in vertical integration triggers a change in entry and exit behavior. When
value added increases due to cheaper inputs, this suggests that there are opportunities to enter.
Therefore during the adjustment process entry may increase. However, the eﬀect on exit is again
indeterminate.
The indicators for concentration, size heterogeneity within industries were derived using the indica-
tor of minimum eﬃcient plant size (MES) suggested by Pashigian (1969) in terms of employment.




where Eι is total employment in the ι-th size class, nι the number of ﬁrms in the size ι-th size
class and E =
P
Eι total industry employment (see Fotopoulos and Spence (1998)). As Davies
(1980) suggests the ratio of MES to extent of the market is better interpreted as measure of the
concentration within an industry. We follow this interpretation and use the growth rate of the
MES to total employment, GCON, as measure of changing concentration. GCON depicts changes
in the carrying capacity of the market (Carree and Thurik (1999)). Conventional wisdom suggests,
that increasing concentration should deter entry and increase exit. GCON is expected to be related
negatively with net entry and turnover.
Table 3: Independent Variables
Variable Name Deﬁnition: Expected sign
Growth of Entry Exit Net Turn Vol
growth of sales GS Sales (+) (-) (+) (0)(+) (-)
growth of employment GE Employment (+) (-) (+) (0)(+) (-)
growth of plant size GMES MES (-) (+) (-) (-) (+)
growth of concentration GCON
MES
Employment (-) (+) (-) (-) (+)
growth of heterogeneity GSUB
MES
Average plant size (+) (-) (+) (0)(+) (+)
growth of Vertical integration GCPX Value added
Gross production value (-) (+)(-) (-) (+)(-) (+)(-)
The MES indicator is weighted measure of plant size. We use the growth rate of MES to proxy
changes in plant size that is of economies of scale. Higher growth rate of minimum eﬃcient plant size
(GMES) indicates a that the average plant size increases. We expect a negative relationship between
changes in minimum eﬃcient plant size (GMES) and entry, and a positive relationship with the exit
rate. Note however, that the eﬀect of scale economies is not conclusive in the empirical literature
(see Geroski (1995)), as there is abundant evidence that production functions in manufacturing
industries are not homothetic (see Caves (1998)).
In order to account for this eﬀect we use GSUB as indicator of heterogeneity. GSUB is deﬁned as
MES divided by average plant size. It can be thought as a measure of the sustainable importance
6of the competitive fringe within an industry. MES is diﬀerent from the average plant size when
there is heterogeneity of plant sizes within an industry.2 An increase in heterogeneity is expected
to be correlated with higher entry and lower exit. The pressure to exit is lowered by higher
heterogeneity, as higher heterogeneity allows for a number of market niches which can accommodate
ﬁrms and weakens the competitive interaction (see Sutton (1998)). Therefore, we expect a negative
relationship between GSUB and exit. GSUB should have a strong inﬂuence on net entry but be
insigniﬁcant for the turnover when the eﬀects are similar for entry and exit. The selection pressure
in an heterogeneous industry is weaker than in a more homogeneous one, we expect a negative
relationship between the entry and exit rate.
By deﬁnition, volatility is driven by the more important component making up the turnover of ﬁrms.
For the period under consideration exit dominates entry in Austrian manufacturing. Therefore we
expect that the parameters with volatility have the same signs as with the exit rate.
Table 4: Summary statistics of independent variables, values are expressed as growth rates in
percent
Variable Mean StdDev Min Max
GE 6.169 12.537 -22.413 42.217
GS -2.028 4.564 -21.798 13.730
GCON 0.946 7.035 -29.190 25.908
GSUB -0.792 6.904 -30.135 25.670
GMES -1.185 7.072 -42.632 18.726
GCPX 0.204 6.497 -28.887 34.223
|GCPX| 3.949 5.157 0.010 34.223
In addition to these variables we experimented with a number of other variables at the model
selection stage. Most prominently we used the growth rate of price-cost margins, lagged employment
growth, GDP growth, advertising intensity, export growth and a measure of capital intensity.
However, these variable were skipped by the model selection procedure. Interestingly the growth
rate of price cost margins is signiﬁcant when GS is dropped form the regression. However, from a
statistical perspective GS dominates the growth rate of price cost margins.3
In out dataset we detected two outliers. This was done as usual by looking at the residuals of
the regression model. We checked whether these residuals are within the one times, two times,
three times the standard deviation of the residuals. For our current application all except of two
values fulﬁll this criterion. These two points result in residuals larger than ﬁve times the standard
2Average plant size is equal to MES if and only if all plants within the industry have the same employment.
3The growth rate of GDP is to the growth rate of sales. However sales is the better predictor. A three factor
latent class model (see the following sections and Appendix A) provides us with means and standard deviations of
the parameters α,β from the marginal posterior. The variable GS is the response, while the GGDP is the prediction
variable. It turns out that k = 3. The following results are taken from 3000 MCMC steps with a burn-in of 1000
steps. GS is linked to GGDP. The elasticity is 2.5, but only 1/4th of the volatility of GS can be explain by GGDP.
7deviation. Therefore we skip these observations in the further analysis. Both outliers are detected
in the leather producing industries time series.
3 Econometric Model
In this paper we want to use a parsimonious model which is capable to reﬂect for heterogeneity
in the data. From Section 2 we already know that our data consist of many relatively short time
series. One opportunity to perform an econometric analysis is on an industry by industry basis.
This approach suﬀers from the fact that a lot of parameters have to be estimated where these
parameters are only based on a few data points. On the other had side we can try to aggregate the
time series. However, this approach is not capable to reﬂect for heterogeneities in the data. Last
but not least we can use panel data models, nevertheless this approach demands for much more
parameters than the model used in this paper. This is the reason why we estimate latent class
models and perform model selection within this class of models.
In the following sections we shall stick to the following notation: yi,t is a response variable of
industry i, i = 1,...,I. Some prediction variables inﬂuence the repose variable in the same way
via the regression parameter α; these variables are called common variables Zi,t. On the other
hand side we want to identify variables with a class speciﬁc impact. I.e. we consider class speciﬁc
variables Wi,t where the regression parameter βj depends on a class index j = 1,...,k. This yields
yi,t = Zi,tα + Wi,tβj + εi,t , (1)
where εi,t are independent standard normally distributed error terms with variance σ2, i.e. εi,t ∼
N(0,σ2). α = (α1,...,αlα)0 measures the homogenous eﬀects while βj = (β1,j,...,βlβ,j)0, j =
1,...,k, are the random eﬀects which are due to heterogeneity in the data. k is the number of
classes.
Furthermore, let us deﬁne a group indicator Si taking values in {1,...,k}; Si,Si0 are pair wise
independent. The number of series i in class j can be observed by looking at Si, it is given by
Dj = #{Si = j}. The corresponding group probabilities P(Si = j) =: ηj, j = 1,...,k. The set
(S1,...,Si,...,SI), I = 17, is abbreviated by S. The MCMC simulation of the group indicators
will serve us with useful byproducts. E.g. we can perform inference whether industry i is most
probably in state j, j = 1,...,k, (i.e. we perform clustering) and for sets of group indicators of
diﬀerent response variables, Sa and Sb respectively, we can analyze possible interdependences.
The set of unknown parameters, S and θ, will be denoted by Ψ in the further analysis. The goal of
Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods is to draw samples from the posterior π(Ψ|Y ) given a prior
Common variables Component speciﬁc variables
GGDP lag ˆ βc,1 ˆ βc,2 ˆ βc,3
2.5009 0.1481 -7.2460 0.6242 2.6363
(0.326) (0.054) (2.445) (1.550) (1.503)
R2 =0.2350 R2
C =0.2291
8distribution of these parameters π(Ψ). Appendix A describes how π(Ψ|Y ) can be simulated by
MCMC and how model selection will be performed.
4 Estimation Results
This section presents the parameter estimates for the entry and exit dynamics. The parameter
estimates are sample means from MCMC output. The terms is parentheses are the corresponding
standard deviations. The corresponding prediction variable is listed above the estimate of the
corresponding parameter. ˆ βc,j stands for the estimate of the constant term in class j. Whenever the
variable lag is used, it denotes the lagged dependent variable. R2 is the coeﬃcient of determination,
R2
C is the adjusted R2 while ˆ π(Y |Ml) is the estimate of the marginal likelihood used to select
amongst models in a Bayesian framework (see Appendix A); its standard deviation is the term in
parentheses.4 Moreover, we would like to comment on the fact that model selection prefers models
also where for some variables the interval parameter estimate ± standard deviation covers zero.
This is especially the case with the variable GCPX. Nevertheless, the reader should note that
including these variables signiﬁcantly improves the model likelihoods; in terms of R2 this eﬀect
accounts for approximately 5 percentage points.
Table 5: Means and standard deviations of the parameters α,β from the marginal posterior for the
variable Entryt; k = 3; (3000 MCMC steps, 1000 burn-in steps).
Common variables
GS GE GCON GSUB GMES lag
0.0457 0.2252 -0.0908 0.2542 -0.2910 0.0819
(0.048) (0.154) (0.116) (0.041) (0.257) (0.035)
Component speciﬁc variables
GCPX1 GCPX2 GCPX3 ˆ βc,1 ˆ βc,2 ˆ βc,3
-0.0212 0.0285 0.0314 5.2868 5.8024 8.2406
(0.113) (0.117) (0.052) (0.604) (0.542) (1.223)
R2 =0.3973 R2
C =0.3756
ˆ π(Y |Ml) = −530.4584 (0.0484)
Let us investigate the estimation results. In Table 3 we have listed the independent variables with
their expected signs. The following paragraphs check these expectations against our estimation
results. Before, we investigate the eﬀects of the individual variables we want to note that the
4For example with Entry we get a model likelihood of −530.4584 (0.0484) for the model presented in Table 5;
skipping the variable GCPX results in −541.6388 (0.1790) with k = 3, while using the predictors of Table 5 and
k = 2 results in −534.0925 (0.139). E.g. for exits we derive −608.0214 (0.385), when skipping the variable |GCPX|;
GCPX is component speciﬁc. For the same setting a two factor analysis results in −614.8413 (0.339). With Net
the three factor model results in −617.5206 (0.0324). For Turn and Vol we derive −707.2449 (0.046) and −772.2268
(0.035) for k = 2 with equal prediction variables.
9Table 6: Means and standard deviations of the parameters α,β from the marginal posterior for the
variable Exitt; k = 3; (3000 MCMC steps, 1000 burn-in steps).
Common variables
GS GE GCON GSUB GMES lag
0.0298 -0.2050 − -0.1192 0.1491 -0.2318
(0.049) (0.081) (0.051) (0.027) (0.025)
Common variables Component speciﬁc variables
|GCPX| GCPX ˆ βc,1 ˆ βc,2 ˆ βc,3
0.1227 -0.0337 7.4983 8.0249 9.8967
(0.052) (0.029) (0.547) (0.570) (0.6950)
R2 =0.2326 R2
C =0.2218
ˆ π(Y |Ml) = −598.5181 (0.0609)
Table 7: Means and standard deviations of the parameters α,β from the marginal posterior for the
variable Nett; k = 2; (3000 MCMC steps, 1000 burn-in steps).
Common variables
GS GE GCON GSUB GMES lag
0.0354 0.2625 − 0.3103 -0.3402 -0.0289
(0.027) (0.093) (0.050) (0.036) (0.046)
Component speciﬁc variables
GCPX1 GCPX2 ˆ βc,1 ˆ βc,2
0.1250 -0.0332 -2.2032 -0.3816
(0.039) (0.044) (0.578) (0.288)
R2 =0.3740 R2
C =0.3582
ˆ π(Y |Ml) = −598.2722 (0.0033)
estimates in Tables 5 to 9 are ”consistent”. From the deﬁnitions of Section 2, the variables Net,
Turn and Vol are functions of Entry and Exit. E.g. we observe that the parameters of Net are
approximately the parameters of Entry minus the parameters of Entry. This check is performed
by looking at the parameter estimates of Table 5 ± the estimated standard deviations and the
estimates of Table 6 ± the estimated standard deviations. If the Net parameters are in these
intervals this kind of consistency criterion is fulﬁlled (see Table 7) ; for the variable GCPX this
type of consistency can also be veriﬁed, this will be done during the discussion of GCPX. Similar
checks have been performed for Turn and Vol.
Sales and Employment (incentives): First let us start with the growth of sales and employment.
These variables are predictors of future proﬁt and market growth, such that the term incentive
variables can be used. We ﬁnd that the response to the two indicators of market growth is diﬀerent
for entry and exit. First of all we observe that the variable GS turns out to be a common variable.
10Table 8: Means and standard deviations of the parameters α,β from the marginal posterior for the
variable Turnt; k = 3; (3000 MCMC steps, 1000 burn-in steps).
Common variables
GS GE GCON GSUB GMES lag
0.0721 − − 0.0664 -0.0748 -0.1336
(0.041) (0.071) (0.041) (0.027)
Component speciﬁc variables
GCPX1 GCPX2 GCPX3 ˆ βc,1 ˆ βc,2 ˆ βc,3
-0.1099 -0.0772 0.0707 13.9501 14.7697 17.2808
(0.179) (0.175) (0.107) (0.936) (0.825) (1.303)
R2 =0.2502 R2
C =0.2386
ˆ π(Y |Ml) = −702.0179 (0.0202)
Table 9: Means and standard deviations of the parameters α,β from the marginal posterior for the
variable V olt; k = 3; (3000 MCMC steps, 1000 burn-in steps).
Common variables
GS GE GCON GSUB GMES lag
0.0435 -0.4360 − -0.3291 0.3796 -0.1700
(0.100) (0.171) (0.107) (0.072) (0.035)
Component speciﬁc variables
GCPX1 GCPX2 GCPX3 ˆ βc,1 ˆ βc,2 ˆ βc,3
-0.0123 -0.0646 -0.0470 14.841 15.903 17.7958
(0.246) (0.202) (0.245) (1.169) (1.033) (1.625)
R2 =0.2012 R2
C =0.1911
ˆ π(Y |Ml) = −770.7551 (0.7649)
I.e. the eﬀect of growth of sales on entry, exit, etc. is homogeneous across the industries concerned.
The signs of the regression parameters in Tables 5, 7 and 8 meet our expectations (see Table 3),
except for Exit. The positive sign in Table 9 shows that the eﬀect from turnover is stronger than
the eﬀect from net entries. Note that the diﬀerence of the GS parameter estimate in Table 8 minus
the estimate in Table 7 is approximately equal to the estimate in Table 9. Surprisingly the sign in
Table 6 is positive which implies that higher sales growth increases exit. One explanation of this
eﬀect is that a growth in sales is accompanied by a displacement eﬀect where newly entering ﬁrms
drive small ﬁrms from the market (Carree and Thurik (1996)). The fact that the GS parameter in
the turnover model dominates the GS parameter in the net entry model strengthens this claim. We
conclude that unexpectedly GS is weakly symmetric. Next, let us investigate employment growth
(GE). In contrast to GS the estimated parameter in Table 6 is negative an meets our expectations
that an increase in employment reduces the pressure to exit. Interestingly model selection skips
11the variable GE in the turnover model. This shows that GE is asymmetric in strong form, as
the GE parameter in the Net model is large and carries a low standard error. As already noted
in Section 2, the strong asymmetry hypothesis corresponds to a coeﬃcient of zero in the Turn
model. We observe that GE is strongly asymmetric while GS is weakly symmetric. The strong
symmetry of GE seems at ﬁrst to contradict the ﬁndings of Carree and Thurik (1999) for retailing
in the Netherlands and MacDonald (1986) for American Manufacturing, who ﬁnd that the eﬀect
of industry growth on the entry rate is larger than on the exit rate. However, the symmetry of GS
indicates that it is the growth without employment which drives these ﬁndings: While employment
growth inﬂuences the entry and exit decisions in the same way, sales growth is diﬀerent, as it drives
ﬁrms into the industry but does not reduce the entry rate at all. Our ﬁnding of weak symmetry
for an incentive variable is not without precedent. Dunne and Roberts (1991) are the ﬁrst widely
quoted study which found weak symmetry for the relationship of price-cost margins and entry and
exit for US manufacturing industries. Fotopoulos and Spence (1998) found the same for Greek
manufacturing. In our case entry is more elastic than exit, so that the sign of GS in the net entry
equation is positive. Depending on entry barriers, entry may not be successful, leads to exit in the
presence of higher sales growth, resulting in higher industry turbulence and volatility.
Growth of plant size: The variable GMES measures the change in the MES and therefore acts as a
measure for the change in scale economies. Overall the estimation results show that the growth rate
of weighted plant size (GMES) is not symmetric. It is as expected negative for entry, positive for
exit. The inﬂuence on net entry is much stronger than its inﬂuence on the turnover. In both models
the inﬂuence is negative. The growth rate of MES reduces both net entry and the turnover of ﬁrms.
Therefore, climbing minimum weighted plant sizes increase the volatility. A higher MES reduces
the carrying capacity of the industry and indicates the presence of scale economies. Contrary
to the ﬁndings of Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) who report a negative relationship between scale
economies and net entry for consumer and intermediate goods industries and a positive for net entry
and capital goods industries for Greek manufacturing, we ﬁnd that the relationship is negative for
all industries. More formally, the variable GMES as a component speciﬁc variable has been rejected
against GMES as a common variable by model selection.
Concentration: Concentration, measured by GCON, is primarily a barrier to entry. A higher
concentration reduces entry. This is in line with the literature (Caves (1998)). However, the
standard deviation of the estimator is high. Thus, model selection excludes the prediction variable
GCON for Exit, Net, Turn and Vol. This result is not surprising given the generally thin evidence
for a strong relationship between turnover and concentration. Baldwin (1995) ﬁnds for Canadian
manufacturing that high turnover and stable concentration are compatible for industries at very
diﬀerent concentration levels. The evidence on the relationship running form concentration to
mobility is similarly thin, for example Acs and Audretsch (1990) reported a positive inﬂuence of
concentration on mobility in U.S. manufacturing.
Heterogeneity: As expected a higher heterogeneity - measured by the variable GSUB - increases
entry, interestingly and in line with our expectations it decreases the exit rate. The eﬀect on net
entry is positive as is the eﬀect on the turnover. We ﬁnd that heterogeneity decreases volatility.
12A more careful look at the parameter estimates of the variable GSUB shows that the estimate in
Table 9 is the diﬀerence of the estimates in Table 8 and Table 7 . I.e. with respect to heterogeneity
the eﬀect of net entries is stronger than the turnover eﬀect. Thus, despite of the fact of higher
turnover (parameter estimate in Table 8 is positive), a higher GSUB creates some kind of room for
new ﬁrms (see Audretsch (1995)). While the eﬀect of GSUB on volatility is negative the eﬀect on
turnover is positive. The eﬀect on net entries positive and stronger than on the turnover. This is
a interesting ﬁnding, as this implies that a higher heterogeneity increases the successful survival of
entering ﬁrms. GSUB is asymmetric which suggests that we are not capturing primarily a fringe
eﬀect. The fringe eﬀect should be symmetric (see Dunne et al. (1988), Rosenbaum and Lamort
(1992), Fotopoulos and Spence (1998)).
Growth in Vertical Integration, Complexity: The variable GCPX is the growth rate of the fraction
of the net to the gross production value. GCPX can derive from vertical integration proper or from
quality upgrading in production. Therefore, the signs in Table 3 are vague. The interesting fact
from a statistical point of view has already been discussed at the beginning of this section. Only
with the volatility the signs of the estimates are unique. A higher GCPX reduces volatility. For
the other variables we observe positive and negative eﬀects of GCPX. Moreover, let us comment
on the exit rates (see Table 6), where the eﬀect of GCPX is negative, but model selection demands
the inclusion of the absolute value of GCPX. Including GCPX and |GCPX| implies nothing more
than an asymmetry with respect to growing and falling vertical integration. If GCPX is positive
the model predicts a rise in the exit rate of 0.0890, while a negative GCPX predicts a increase in
the exit rate of 0.1564. This asymmetry may be due to non-rational eﬀects, like every change -
independent of the direction - creates an incentive for some ﬁrms to leave the market or due to
threshold eﬀects which are related to shocks. Model selection skips this variable |GCPX| in all
other setups. What remains to show is that the estimates of the variable GCPX is ”consistent”
as discussed at the beginning of this section. Thus, the GCPX parameters in Table 5 minus the
estimates in Table 6 have to approximately result in the GCPX parameters in Table 7. Using 0.0890
and 0.1564 with the corresponding standard deviations and the GCPX estimates of Table 5, we
easily cover the estimates of Table 7. Overall we ﬁnd that GCPX is weakly positively asymmetric
for industries which have a low net entry state in the net entry equation (see Table 7). For the
other industries nothing deﬁnitive can be said. The turnover equation (Table 8) is interesting.
Here the intercept should capture primarily mobility barrier eﬀects. H¨ olzl (2003) reports that
CPX is a strong mobility barrier. We see that for high mobility barrier industries the eﬀect of a
higher GCPX is negative but for industries with low mobility barriers the association is positive.
However, the standard errors are quite large. This suggests that changes in the complexity of
operations have diﬀerent eﬀects on the turnover depending on the level mobility barriers. That
the model selection did not call for the inclusion of the complexity variable (CPX) in levels can
be interpreted in terms of the ﬁxed eﬀects captured by the switching intercept. It is well known
that the relative time invariance of structural entry and exit barriers leads to the fact that industry
dynamics regressions change dramatically when ﬁxed eﬀect regressions are used (Geroski (1995),
Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999)). The ﬁxed eﬀects purge the variable of some of their between variation
13which is then already captured by the intercepts.5
Symmetry: The symmetry hypothesis states that entry barriers are also exit barriers. If this is
correct the estimates in the Entry and the Exit model have to agree. Investigating our results this
implies that the marginal posteriors do not overlap too strongly. We check whether estimates ±
the estimated standard deviates of Tables 5 and 6 overlap. An additional check of symmetry result
from the Turn and the Net models. Strong symmetry demands for a lot of probability mass around
zero for the marginal posterior of the parameters in the net entry model, such that model selection
excludes such prediction variables. This is only the case for GCON (see Table 7). However, GCON
is also skipped in the Turn model. Strong asymmetry demands for a lot of probability mass around
zero for the marginal posterior of the parameters in the turnover model, such that model selection
excludes such prediction variables. This is only the case for GE (see Table 8). For GSUB, and
GMES we ﬁnd weak asymmetry and for GS weak symmetry. Last but not least, for GCPX we ﬁnd
indications of asymmetry and symmetry across the industry groupings identiﬁed by the estimation
procedure. This is consistent with the interpretation that GCPX is a proxy for intangible sunk
costs related to organizational capital and the knowledge base of the production process. The
coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant. This may be related to the fact that technological change is a slow
process which is not well captured in our statistical model which emphasizes short and medium
run dynamics.
Lagged variables: Statistical modeling demands for including the lagged explanatory variable to
the set of prediction variables. From an economic point of view, these parameters can be used to
characterize the long run behavior. Interestingly the estimated parameters of the lagged dependent
variable have diﬀerent signs for Entry and Exit. Table 5 shows a relatively small and positive
parameter estimate. This implies that entries are weakly persistent, i.e. high entries yesterday
result in high entries today. Contrary to the entry rate, exit rates exhibit a negative autoregres-
sive parameter, the same is observed with the net entry rate. A negative autocorrelation can be
motivated by the fact that if net entry is high in t − 1, then due to higher competition, the proﬁt
opportunities are reduced in t; thus Net should decrease. A similar story holds for exits. Although
this claim should also hold for the entry rate, this eﬀect is perhaps overcompensated by some herd
behavior such that a positive lagged parameter estimate is derived. Herd behavior can be due to
irrationality or lack of information. Since the negative parameter for exits has a signiﬁcantly higher
absolute value than the Entry and the Net parameter estimates, the lagged parameters for Vol and
Turn should be negative; the estimates of Table 8 and 9 verify this claim.
Clustering of industries: Another aspect with our the data set is the question:
What industries i can be attributed to state or component j?
This questions can be investigated by means of MCMC output on the latent indicator S. For the
entries, exits, net entries, turnover and volatility regressions the sampler provides series of (S
[m]
Entry),
5Furthermore, we would like to remark that some of the CPXi, i = 1,...,17, are very close to a unit root (at a









V ol), where [m] is the index of the MCMC sampling step. Thus for
a given model, the sampler provides us with the posterior distribution of the latent variable Si for
each industry. Therefore we are able to assign an industry to a component or state j, j = 1,...,k,
by calculating absolute frequencies from (S
[m]
i ). An estimate ˆ Si is derived by taking the component
with the highest frequency. This results in a clustering of the industries. The reader should note
that the MCMC sampler estimates the parameters and clusters the time series simultaneously.
Therefore this procedure is also called Bayesian clustering. Tables 5-9 have already shown that the
clustering is mainly due to the diﬀerent barriers and incentives, respectively. The entry grouping
captures entry barriers which are diﬀerent across a class of industries. The switching intercept
in the exit equation accounts for exit barriers. Especially interesting is the interpretation of the
groupings in the Net and Turn equations. From the deﬁnition of symmetry and asymmetry we can
conclude that the grouping in the turnover equation captures primarily barriers to mobility, while
the net entry grouping accounts for common incentives and opportunities that are not accounted
for by the variables used. Based on this it would be surprising to ﬁnd that the clustering is uniform
for the industries.
Table 10: Clustering of Industries by ˆ Si, j = 1,...,k; (3000 MCMC steps, 1000 burn-in steps)
i Industry Grouping Entry Exit Net Turn Vol
estimated components k 3 3 2 3 3
1 stone and ceramics intermediate 1 3 2 1 1
2 glass and glass products intermediate 2 3 2 2 2
3 chemical industries intermediate 1 2 2 1 1
4 manufacture of pulp and paper intermediate 2 1 1 3 2
5 paper processing intermediate 1 2 2 1 1
6 wood processing consumer 2 2 2 2 2
7 food and tobacco consumer 1 2 2 1 1
8 leather producing consumer 2 1 1 3 2
9 leather processing consumer 3 1 1 3 3
10 foundries capital 1 2 2 2 1
11 metal industry except steel capital 1 3 2 3 1
12 machinery and steel constructions capital 1 3 2 2 1
13 transportation equipment capital 1 3 2 1 1
14 iron and metal products capital 1 2 2 2 1
15 electrical equipment and components capital 2 2 2 1 2
16 textiles except clothing consumer 2 1 1 3 2
17 clothing consumer 3 1 1 3 3
15Table 10 presents these estimates for the models and industries considered in this paper. E.g.
consider the variable Entry: We observe that most industries are assigned to component/state 1,
where we have a low entry rate (see estimates of the intercept ˆ βc,j in Table 5). In this state we have
a negative but low inﬂuence of the complexity variable GCPX. The industries with i = 2,4,6,15,16
belong to component 2, where the entry rate is slightly above component 1, however the inﬂuence
of the complexity variable is low but positive for this component. Only in the leather processing
and clothing industries we have a high entry rate. For the remaining variables the estimates of Si
can be interpreted equivalently. Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) studied the net entry behavior for
three groups of Greek manufacturing industries - consumer, intermediate and capital goods. They
found that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the determinants of net entry rates across industry
groups. Table 10 reports in the third column the sectoral classiﬁcation. We ﬁnd that our Bayesian
clustering is not related in a strong form to the sectoral classiﬁcation, with the exception that
capital goods industries seem to be more homogeneous than the other industries. However, the
Bayesian clustering for the turnover behavior - according to Dunne et al. (1988) better suited to
characterize industries than net entry rates - shows overall no relation to the sectoral grouping:
Each value of the estimated component is found in each of the sectoral groupings. This result
suggests that there is still high heterogeneity within the sectoral classiﬁcation. It is worth noting
that there is no one to one relationship between a high entry rate and a high exit rate or vice versa.
By the following questions we investigate this problem in more detail:
1. Does a high entry rate in industry i imply a high net entry rate? Or more precisely, are
SEntry, SExit, SNet, STurn and SV ol independent.
2. Does a high exit rate imply a low net entry rate?
3. Are industries with high entry, exit or net entry rates more or less volatile?
As already described in the analysis of ˆ Si, these questions can be investigated by means of MCMC
output on the latent indicator S. For the entries, exits, net entries, turnover and volatility re-










V ol), where [m] is the index
of the MCMC sampling step. The following analysis cannot show causalities, however indepen-
dence can be checked easily. By applying χ2 contingency table tests (see e.g. Bickel and Doksum
(2001)[p. 405]), we observe that the zero hypothesis Sa is independent of Sb has to be rejected - even
on a 1% conﬁdence level - for all pairs Sa,Sb taken form {SEntry,SExit,SNet,STurn,SV ol}. Then,
conditional probabilities can be obtained from MCMC output. I.e. calculate P(Sa = j ∩ Sb = j0)
and P(Sb = j0) from MCMC output, then
P(Sa = j|Sb = j0) =
P(Sa = j ∩ Sb = j0)
P(Sb = j0)
. (2)
Table 11 presents the estimates of these conditional probabilities. Note that Table 11 reads as
follows: the conditional probability that the exit rate is in state j = 1 (exits are low) given that
entries are low j0 = 1 is 0.3432, etc.
16Table 11 provides us with the following information: The conditional probabilities of exits given
entries are not very diﬀerent for entries being in class one or two. A look at the estimates of
the intercept terms βc,1 βc,2 also conﬁrms this results since their posteriors have relatively large
overlapping regions (see Table 5). For SEntry = 3 the probabilities of Exits | Entries are diﬀerent.
Stronger diﬀerences are observed with the variables entry, exit and turnover. I.e. consider the third
row: If entries are in state one, then the conditional probability of low or medium turnover is high,
0.4835 and 0.3981 respectively. Approximately the same is observed with a medium entry rate,
while with high entry rate (j0 = 3) the conditional probability of low turnover is 0.1824.
For exits and entries we observe that when turnover is low then the probabilities of low and medium
entry rates are high and vice versa. With net entries this eﬀect is already present but much weaker
than with the gross rates.
Table 11: Conditional probabilities P(Sa = j|Sb = j0) ; (3000 MCMC steps, 1000 burn-in steps)
j0 1 2 3
j 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Sb = Sentry
Exit 0.3432 0.4179 0.2390 0.3319 0.4113 0.2568 0.4802 0.3131 0.2066
Net 0.4500 0.5500 − 0.4778 0.5222 − 0.2274 0.7726 −
Turn 0.4835 0.3981 0.1184 0.4405 0.4148 0.1447 0.1824 0.3925 0.4251
Vol 0.3317 0.3809 0.2874 0.3137 0.3708 0.3155 0.3249 0.3224 0.3527
Sb = Sexit
Entry 0.3870 0.3695 0.2435 0.4331 0.4210 0.1459 0.4082 0.4332 0.1587
Net 0.2643 0.7357 − 0.4327 0.5673 − 0.6357 0.3643 −
Turn 0.4492 0.3990 0.1518 0.4428 0.4266 0.1306 0.2987 0.3737 0.3276
Vol 0.3946 0.3678 0.2376 0.3135 0.3782 0.3083 0.2309 0.3433 0.4258
Sb = SNet
Entry 0.4395 0.4607 0.0998 0.3893 0.3649 0.2458 − − −
Exit 0.2289 0.4077 0.3634 0.4617 0.3873 0.1510 − − −
Turn 0.3765 0.3944 0.2292 0.4352 0.4107 0.1541 − − −
Vol 0.2492 0.3619 0.3889 0.3768 0.3690 0.2542 − − −
Sb = STrub
Entry 0.4833 0.4347 0.0820 0.4045 0.4162 0.1793 0.2617 0.3159 0.4224
Exit 0.3982 0.4270 0.1748 0.3595 0.4182 0.2223 0.2975 0.2785 0.4240
Net 0.3853 0.6147 − 0.4103 0.5897 − 0.5187 0.4813 −
Vol 0.3608 0.3942 0.2450 0.3205 0.3714 0.3081 0.2459 0.2918 0.4623
Sb = SV ol
Entry 0.4212 0.3933 0.1855 0.4270 0.4105 0.1625 0.3794 0.4112 0.2093
Exit 0.4443 0.3841 0.1716 0.3656 0.4090 0.2253 0.2782 0.3927 0.3291
Net 0.3240 0.6760 − 0.4155 0.5845 − 0.5257 0.4743 −
Turn 0.4583 0.4004 0.1412 0.4421 0.4098 0.1480 0.3236 0.4003 0.2761
Dunne et al. (1988) studied serial correlation and correlation for US manufacturing industries and
17found entry and exit is volatile but also indication that the high correlation between entry and
exit is related to industry-speciﬁc factors. Since the variables inferred by our econometric tools
are included in the entry and the exit rate model (except GCON), the dependent variables Entry
and Exit are correlated. Our analysis shows that some kind of extra interdependence between







This paper studies entry and exit dynamics for the Austrian manufacturing sector. The study is
based on sector based data form 1981 to 1994, provided from the Austrian chamber of commerce.
We ﬁnd that our model was relatively successful in identifying the patterns of entry and exit within
Austrian manufacturing. The regression results indicate that there is a strong structure eﬀect
determining the entry and exit dynamics in Austrian Manufacturing. The analysis of conditional
probabilities shows that entry and exit processes are closely related. Whether this is due to sym-
metry or due to simultaneity is relegated to further research. We obtained a number of important
insights:
1. Changes in MES, size heterogeneity and concentration are not symmetric in respect to entry
and exit.
2. The growth rates in sales and employment do indicate diﬀerent aspects of industry growth.
The growth of industry employment is strongly asymmetric, while the growth rate of sales is
weakly symmetric. This result of symmetry of an incentive mirrors the results obtained for
proﬁtability measures by Dunne and Roberts (1991) and Fotopoulos and Spence (1998).
3. Changes in complexity of operations are asymmetric for sectors with particularly low net
entry rates, while they are symmetric for other industries.
4. There is a close relationship between entry and exit rates across industries in Austrian Man-
ufacturing: The turnover of ﬁrms inﬂuences the changes in the number of competitors. Low
entry rates go hand in hand with low net entry rates and a low turnover.
5. The Bayesian clustering of industries indicates that no simple classiﬁcation can be made which
accounts for incentives and barriers.
An interesting question remaining for further research is whether entries, exits, employment and
production are truly interdependent. We want to know whether market entries stimulate economic
growth and generate employment and vice versa. I.e. we want to investigate ”causalities”. An
industry by industry analysis will prevent us from including weakly exogenous variables due to
identiﬁcation issues. Estimation an identiﬁcation of latent class system has to be developed. As
18far as we know this problem has not been solved.6 Therefore, this question has to be postponed to
further research.
6Some ﬁrst results, neglecting identiﬁcation and prior construction can be found in Ansari (2000).
19A Bayesian analysis of latent class models
This section brieﬂy describes the Bayesian estimation methodology of model (1) based on T¨ uchler
et al. (2001), Otter et al. (2002) and Fr¨ uhwirth-Schnatter and Kaufmann (2002). Let us consider
a latent class model (1):
yi,t = Zi,tα + Wi,tβj + εi,t ,
where εi,t are independent standard normally distributed error terms with variance σ2, i.e. εi,t ∼
N(0,σ2). The unknown variables in the model are α, β = (β1,...,βk), the group probabilities
η = (η1,...,ηk) and the variance term σ2. This set of unknown variables is abbreviated by θ. The
augmented set of parameters consists of θ and the latent indicator variable S = (S1,...,Si,...,SI);
the set (θ ∪ S) is called Ψ. Y =
S
i,t{yi,t,Zi,t,Wi,t} are the data available.
By the Bayes theorem (see e.g. Robert (1994) or Bickel and Doksum (2001)) we have the following
relationship between the posterior π(Ψ|Y ), the likelihood f(Y |Ψ) and the prior π(Ψ):
π(Ψ|Y ) ∝ f(Y |Ψ)π(Ψ) , (3)
where the symbol ∝ stands for ”proportional to”. By the model assumptions the likelihood factor-
izes into a product of normal densities fN(.), i.e.










1(Si=j) is an indicator function. This implies that yi,t ∼ N(Zi,tα + Wi,tβj,σ2), for Si = j.
Priors: Since we perform a Bayesian estimation of the parameters we have to deﬁne a prior distri-
bution for Ψ, π(Ψ). π(Ψ) decomposes into
π(Ψ) = π(S|θ)π(θ) = π(S|η)π(η)π(β)π(α)π(σ2) . (5)
Conditional on η, Si are multinomial trials, such that π(S|θ) =π(S|η) =Πk
j=1η
Dj
j by the model
assumptions. For the remaining parameters we use conjugate priors. For η we use a Dirichlet prior
D(e01,...,e0k). In the current analysis we set e0. = 1, resulting in a uniform prior on the unit
simplex, i.e. this prior is uninformative. For π(β) and π(α) we use normal priors N(a0,A0) and
N(b0,B0). We set a0 and b0 to vectors of zeros; the dimensions correspond to the dimensions of
α and β. A0 and B0 are diagonal matrices of proper dimensions, the diagonal elements are set to
1000. Finally, we use the conjugate inverse gamma prior IG(ν0,G0) for π(σ2); we set ν0 = 1 and
G0 = 1. By these uninformative prior assumptions the impact of the prior on the estimation results
is minor.
MCMC: Since all conditional distributions of model (1) are well deﬁned, Markow chain Monte
Carlo methods can be applied easily. For more detailed information on Markov chain Monte Carlo
methods the reader is referred to Albert and Chib (1993), Casella and George (1992), Greene (1997)
20and Robert (1994). For the underlying model updating sweep m, from Ψ[m−1] to Ψ[m], is split up
into four steps:
Step 1: S[m] from π(S|Y,θ[m−1])
Step 2: η[m] from π(η|Y,S[m])
Step 3: (α[m],β[m]) from π(α,β|Y,S[m],σ2 [m−1])
Step 4: σ2 [m] from π(σ2|Y,Sm,α[m],β[m])
The above procedure is repeated until the Markov-chain has reached or is supposed to be near its
invariant distribution. In this article convergence will be checked as follows: We run the sampler for
M = 3000 time steps and cut oﬀ the ﬁrst 1000 samples of (Ψ[m]) (burn-in phase). By repeating this
procedure, we check whether the generated distributions derived from diﬀerent runs agree. If an
unrestricted sampler is applied the sampler produces or proposes candidates from only some regions
of the parameter space (i.e. mixing is bad). Imposing a restriction R on θ, i.e. θ1 < ... < θj < ... <
θk, clearly improves the mixing of the sampler. In this article, we follow the method of Fr¨ uhwirth-
Schnatter (2001) called permutation sampling which is very eﬃcient from a computational point of
view. To be more precise it turns out that the restriction R on βc=(βc,1,...,βc,k)0 performs well
with the underlying data; βc,j is the constant term.
Let us brieﬂy comment on steps 1-4: For Step 1 we propose S from an uniform distribution on a
discrete grid. To update S we use the Metropolis Hasting algorithm (see e.g. Robert and Casella




















Since we chose a Dirichlet prior the conditional π(η|Y,S[m]) is once again a Dirichlet distribution
with parameters ej = e0,j +Dj, where Dj = #(Si = j). To sample α and β in one block, we deﬁne
a vector of regression parameters γ := (α,β1,...,βj,...,βk)0. If α is of dimension lα and βj is of
dimension lβ then the dimension of γ is lγ = lα + klβ. Next we construct a design matrix V as
follows: Vi,t = (Zi,t Wi,t1(Si=1) ... Wi,t1(Si=j) ... Wi,t1(Si=k)). V
(T)
i = (Vi,t)T
t=1 is of dimension




k )0, the dimension is [TI ×qγ]. Note that y is a stacked
vector consisting of ((yi,t))T
t=1)I
i=1. Then yi,t = Vi,tγ + εi,t is a standard regression model where
we condition on S. Thus, we are able to use the normal priors and deﬁne c0 = (a0,b0,...,b0)0
and C0 = diag(A0,B0,...,B0); b0 and B0 are inserted for k times into c0 and C0, diag stands for
diagonal matrix. Then (α,β) is normal with parameters c and C, where
C =
 










21Now (α,β) can be sampled in Step 3 from a N(c,C) distribution. Last but not least σ2 is sampled
from an inverse gamma distribution with parameters ν = ν0 + IT




σ2 is large like in the data we use in our analysis, MH updates from a log normal proposal of the
variance of the regression residuals turned out to be more eﬃcient than Gibbs updates.
Model Selection: Model selection in Bayesian setting is elegant but time consuming. Therefore
we pre-select some model by some standard but non-Bayesian criteria. Here, we use the adjusted
coeﬃcient of determination R2
C the Scharz criterion. We derive the adjusted R2
C and the Scharz
criterion from MCMC output as follows: (i) Calculate the posterior means ˆ α and ˆ σ2. (ii) Plug in
ˆ α to derive R2
C; R2 is calculated equivalently.
¿From a pure Bayesian point of view, we are interested in the posterior probabilities
π(Ml|Y ) ∝ π(Y |Ml)π(Ml)
of some models (Ml), l = 1,...,L.
¿From the Bayes theorem we know that the non-normalized posterior fulﬁls π(Ψ|Y ) ∝ f(Y |Ψ)π(Ψ).







f(Y |Ψ)π(dΨ) is the normalizing constant. This normalizing constant is nothing more than
π(Y |Ml), which is required to calculate the model posterior. Thus, given a prior for a model,
π(Ml), we derive the posterior probabilities of a set of models (Ml), l = 1,...,L, by calculating
π(Y |Ml) from MCMC output. In this paper we apply the method of importance sampling as
described in Fr¨ uhwirth-Schnatter (2002), to derive the desired model posterior. In the ongoing
analysis we use the uninformative model prior π(Ml) = 1/L, such that the posterior distribution
of the models Ml is determined by the normalizing constants π(Y |Ml). The ”best” model is the
model with the highest posterior probability, i.e. we choose the model where the estimate ˆ π(Y |Ml)
peaks; the standard deviation of ˆ π(Y |Ml) is derived by bootstrapping.
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